Southern California Arbitration Mediation and Conflict Resolution : Settle it Now Dispute Resolution Services : Serving Los Angeles, Beverly Hills, Century City : Settle It Now Negotiation Blog

Challenges to good faith settlements that cut off the rights of non-settling defendants to seek indemnification and contribution from settling defendants are nearly always doomed to failure.  Trial courts are understandably eager to clear their dockets and there's no docket-clean-up pitcher like the first defendant to settle.  Deny the motion and bring a settled defendant and his trial-ready resources back in to the litigation when the first defendant-domino has just successfully toppled over?   Not likely, my friend. Not in the trial court at any rate.

These motions are so difficult to oppose that I've seen a target defendant threaten a marginal player (my client) with sanctions just for challenging the target's very low six-figure settlement in an eight-figure antitrust action.

It looks like low value settlements got just a little bit harder to defend yesterday when the Second District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's good faith settlement finding in  Long Beach Memorial Medical Center v. Superior Court (Conners).

Best quotation:  "The hospital contends that the physicians‟ $200,000 settlement -- representing 2 percent of plaintiffs‟ $10 million damages estimate -- was so far out of the “ballpark” it was not even in the parking lot."  With a first runner-up to "If section 877.6 is to serve the ends of justice, it must prevent a party from purchasing protection from its indemnification obligation at bargain-basement prices."

The Court of Appeal relied upon the following "facts" in finding that the trial court abused its considerable discretion in granting a good faith motion to defendant physicians in light of defendant hospital's opposition.

• payment of $200,000 in settlement for a $10 million claim, which the appellate court found to be "wholly disproportionate."  As the Court opined "[e]ven a slight probability of liability on [the settling doctor's] part would warrant a contribution more significant than 2 percent."
•  the "evidence" supporting the court's finding that the settling physician's probable fault was "not de minimis,"  which appears to have been based upon Plaintiff's attorney's fault analysis (not generally known for its unbiased nature) and the physicians' counsel's candid (?) suggestion that his clients' contribution to a global settlement might be in the range of $1.5 million;
• the availability of $2 million in coverage, which "militated against a good faith determination" because the settlement constituted only 10% of available policy limits [carrier alert here!];
• the non-settling Hospital's contention that the physicians and their attorneys engaged in "bad faith tactics" during two mediation sessions -- a factor the appellate court acknowledged it was barred by mediation confidentiality from considering -- but which it neatly avoided by concentrating on post-mediation negotiations; /*
• the timing of the physicians' settlement offer, which suggested to the appellate court that their "reason for entering into the settlement with plaintiffs was to cut off the hospital's . . .  right to indemnity from the physicians" (I thought that was a legitimate reason to settle litigation but see the Court's citation to Mattco Forge, stating that when a defendant  “enters into a disproportionately low settlement with the plaintiff solely to obtain immunity from the cross-complaint, the inference that the settlement was not made in good faith is difficult to avoid.” Mattco, supra (emphasis added); and,
• a consideration I've never seen defeat a good faith motion before - that a settlment "dictated by the tactical advantage of removing a deep-pocket defendant . . . is not made in 'good faith' consideration of the relevant liability of all parties. . . ." (leading to the question whether we're now required to consider the interests of clients other than our own in entering into a settlement agreement on a contested claim)

If this case isn't depublished (an unfortunate California practice) or taken up for review, it will bear re-reading and deeper thinking about the stategy and tactics of breaking away from the mob to cut a separate deal beneficial to one's own client without "consider[ing] . . the relevant liability of all parties . . . "

Comments welcome!!

 

________________

*/  This is a good place to note the importance of either indicating in the parties' post-mediation written negotiations that the mediation is continuing (hence the communications remain absolutely protected) or that the mediation has concluded (hence bringing those post-mediation settlement negotiations outside the scope of the strictly enforced mediation confidentiality restrictions).

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From the Los Angeles Daily Journal

November 21, 2008

CONFIDENTIALITY QUESTION HEADED BACK TO TRIAL COURT  By Greg Katz

LOS ANGELES - The state Supreme Court has denied review of an appellate decision that had become a cause celebre for mediators concerned about confidentiality precedents.

Instead, the case will head back for a new trial that includes a dispute over whether a hand-drawn chart, created in a probate mediation and initialed dozens of times by the parties, should have been admissible as evidence.

 A trial court had said that it was not, but the 2nd District Court of Appeal overturned the decision, saying it was in effect a settlement agreement and admissible under Evidence Code Section 1123(c). Thottam v. Thottam, B196933 and B196934 (Cal App. 2nd Dist., filed Sept. 3, 2008).

Many mediators expressed concern that the appellate ruling hurts mediation confidentiality by making draft documents admissible, and the case drew amicus letters from pro-ADR lobbying group California Dispute Resolution Council and others.

But the high court Wednesday denied review. 

Tyna Orren, who won the appeal for Los Angeles-based attorney and political activist Peter Thottam, said she was happy but unsurprised that the court didn't take up the case. 

"The reason mediators don't need to be concerned is that the opinion now tells them precisely what they need to do to avoid what happened in Thottam. Nobody should sign anything which leaves an opening for anything to be divulged," she said.

The 2nd District panel reasoned that the document appeared to be a settlement agreement, and that the parties had signed a premediation agreement allowing for the admissibility of mediation evidence that supported any agreements reached. That qualified the document for an exception in mediation confidentiality statutes.

"Whether or not the document contained all necessary details for enforcement, it certainly contained adequate manifestation of mutual consent to material terms which were capable of being made certain," making it a settlement agreement, Presiding Justice Norman L. Epstein wrote for the unanimous panel.

Justices Thomas L. Wilhite Jr. and Steven C. Suzukawa joined in the opinion.

Beverly Hills-based mediator Victoria Pynchon, who closely followed the case, said it was more about interpretation of the mediation agreement than about confidentiality, that the Supreme Court has vigorously defended the state's confidentiality laws in the past.

Attorneys should rely strictly on those laws when drafting mediation agreements, she said. "Just quote the statute or refer to the statute. Don't get fancy."

Stephen L. Kaplan of Laguna Niguel's Hicks, Mims, Kaplan & Burns, who had petitioned for review, said he was disappointed but expected that the new trial would go in favor of his clients, as the first one had.

The only difference: "There'll be one more piece of evidence," Kaplan said.

greg_katz@dailyjournal.com

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Excerpts from Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. below.  Comment will follow.

[T]he fact that the settlement was reached during mediation to which Evidence Code section 1119 applies does not eliminate the court’s obligation to evaluate the terms of the settlement and to ensure that they are fair, adequate and reasonable. If some relevant information is subject to a privilege that the court must respect, other data must be provided that will enable the court to make an independent assessment of the adequacy of the settlement terms.

[T]he fact that communications were made during the mediation and writings prepared for use in the mediation that are inadmissible and not subject to compulsory production does not mean that the underlying data, not otherwise privileged, is also immune from production. (Evid. Code, § 1120 [“Evidence otherwise admissible or subject to discovery outside of a mediation . . . shall not be or become inadmissible or protected from disclosure solely by reason of its introduction or use in a mediation . . .]; Rojas v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 407, 417; Wimsatt v. Superior Court (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 137, 157-158.)

Foot Locker’s payroll records, for example, if relevant to the quantification of the claims being settled, are subject to discovery and may be introduced in opposition to the settlement even if they were disclosed to class counsel during the mediation, and even if class counsel was shown only a summary or analysis of those records that is not itself subject to production because prepared for use in the mediation.

                           *                           *                      *

Following the opportunity for limited discovery, the trial court should redetermine whether the proposed settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. The court may and undoubtedly should continue to place reliance on the competence and integrity of counsel, the involvement of a qualified mediator, and the paucity of objectors to the settlement. But the court must also receive and consider enough information about the nature and magnitude of the claims being settled, as well as the impediments to recovery, to make an independent assessment of the reasonableness of the terms to which the parties have agreed.

We do not suggest that the court should attempt to decide the merits of the case or to substitute its evaluation of the most appropriate settlement for that of the attorneys. However, as the court does when it approves a settlement as in good faith under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, the court must at least satisfy itself that the class settlement is within the “ballpark” of reasonableness. (See Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499-500.)

While the court is not to try the case, it is “ ‘called upon to consider and weigh the nature of the claim, the possible defenses, the situation of the parties, and the exercise of business judgment in determining whether the proposed settlement is reasonable.’ ” (City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., supra, 495 F.2d at p. 462, italics added.) This the court cannot do if it is not provided with basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise.

By remanding we do not suggest that the proposed settlement ultimately may not pass muster. We hold only that the trial court may not finally approve the settlement agreement until provided with sufficient information to assure itself that the terms of the agreement are indeed fair, adequate and reasonable.

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How do California's Courts protect mediation confidentiality?  Let me count the ways. You can't impliedly waive the protections of Evidence Code section 1115 et seq. nor be estopped from raising them.  Their walls will not be breached by allegations of fraud or any lesser form of bad faith. 

Still, litigants keep on trying.

The same week during which a Petition for Review of the recent Thottam opinion went up to the California Supreme Court ("the big print giveth, the small print taketh away) yet another appellate opinion came down telling us that you cannot be judicially estopped from asserting mediation confidentiality -- this time in connection with a party's request for an award of attorneys' fees under Civil Code section 1717.  The case is  Rael v. Davis, yet another estate dispute not entirely unlike Thottam.

(here, by the way, is the Thottam Petition for Review)

I continue to find that 90% of the attorneys whose cases I mediate do not know:

1. how to protect their mediated deal by complying with the requirements of Evidence code section 1123; or
2. just how strong the confidentiality protections are in California, both before and after the Supreme Court's Simmons v. Ghaderi opinion.

I will say it again:  litigators settle cases at mediation at their peril if they do not stay current with the torrent of cases coming down from the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal on the issues of enforcement and confidentiality.  Fail to properly document the settlement agreement, have it blow up in the parties' faces, follow it with litigation over the agreement that was supposed to settle the underlying litigation and you've got an explosive mixture leading straight to your malpractice carrier's front door.

Hey!  Be careful out there!

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AUGUST 25, 2008 | FORUM

If You Know the Case Law, Litigation Doesn't Have to be Robotic

By Victoria Pynchon 

Here in California, there's no stronger rule of confidentiality than that applied to a mediation. It cannot be impliedly waived like most privileges, including the near-sacred attorney-client privilege. Simmons v. Ghaderi, 2008 DJDAR 11107. You cannot be estopped from relying on it. Eisendrath v. Superior Court, 109 Cal.App.4th 351 (2003). And if you want your mediated settlement agreement enforced, you must strictly comply with the requirements of Evidence Code Section 1123. Fair v. Bakhtiari, 40 Cal.4th 189 (2006).

Insurance policy-holder counsel Kirk Pasich of Dickstein Shapiro has criticized nearly all recent interpretations of mediation confidentiality by the California Supreme Court on the ground that they permit insurance carriers to use mediation proceedings to engage in acts of bad faith.

"Why should a carrier get a license to act in bad faith in mediation," Pasich asked, adding, "Cases settled, and still settle, in mandatory settlement conferences without that same shield. I don't think a process should exist that encourages, rather than discourages, a party from acting in bad faith."

Why, indeed?

If you do not understand the differences between settlement conferences and mediations, you are not alone. My informal surveys indicate that litigators believe there's no difference whatsoever between the two and few mediators are able to distinguish between them despite their training in the field. Nor have California's courts been of any real assistance.

What's in a name? Here, plenty. The application of California's Rules of Evidence to mediations has such significant potential economic consequences that mediator and litigator malpractice actions are surely looming on the horizon.

What type of misbehavior can occur in a mediation? Here are just a few examples: One party can make a misrepresentation of material fact on which the other relies in entering into a settlement agreement; as Pasich notes, an insurance carrier can act in bad faith; one mediating party could tortiously interfere with a third party's contract or prospective economic advantage; or the mediating parties can enter into a collusive settlement agreement, depriving the settling parties' co-defendants from learning facts necessary to challenge the settlement in a "good faith" hearing.

Even if all parties have expressed complete agreement during the mediation, which they then memorialize in a term sheet, absent strict compliance with the requirements of Evidence Code Section 1123, no evidence probative of that agreement will be admissible in a California court.
If the mediating parties are engaged in a settlement conference, none of this potentially bad behavior would be protected.

Given the potentially significant adverse economic consequences that can flow from a mediation, California's courts have clarified the differences between the two procedures, right?

Not so much.

If you have a DJ subscription, continue reading here.

 

Enforcement of Mediated Settlement Agreements in California - Get more Legal Forms

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This page can always be found under Links to the left. 

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UPDATE:  See the analysis of Thottam at May it Please the Court, noting that the "big print giveth and the small print taketh away."

Before further discussing the problems created by the Thottam holding, I'm providing a "brief" of the case about which I ranted and raved earlier here today.  

• THE FACTS: 
  • A mediation confidentiality agreement entered into by the parties in Thottam provided that “all matters discussed, agreed to, admitted to, or resulting from ... [the mediation meeting]...
    • "shall be kept confidential and not disclosed to any outside person . . . ;
    • "shall not be used in any current or future litigation between us (except as may be necessary to enforce any agreements resulting from the Meeting), and,
    • "shall be considered privileged and, as a settlement conference, non-admissible under the California Evidence Code in any current or future litigation between us.”  
  • One of the parties contended that a chart drawn up and signed by the parties during the mediation, 
    • was sufficiently certain to be enforced according to its terms; and,
    • was admissble into evidence under section 1123(c) despite its failure to satisfy any of 1123(c)'s requirements.
  • THE RULES:
    • Evidence Code section 1123(c) provides that a "written settlement agreement prepared in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation, is not made inadmissible, or protected from disclosure . . . if
      • "the agreement is signed by the settling parties and any of the following conditions are satisfied . . .
      • "(c) all parties to the agreement expressly agree in writing . . . to its disclosure."Id. (emphasis added).
  • PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT
    • Without finding that the settlement "chart" constituted a "written settlement agreement" under section 1123, the Thottam trial court required one of the parties to testify about otherwise confidential mediation communications because the Confidentiality Agreement required the disclosure of mediation confidences "necessary to enforce any agreements resulting from the [mediation.]"
    • Apparently before Elizabeth could testify, the civil action to enforce the alleged settlement agreement was consolidated with other proceedings in the Probate Court,
    • at the trial of the consolidated matters, the Probate Judge refused to accept the settlement chart into evidence because it did not comply with the provisions of section 1123(c).
  • THE APPELLATE DECISION
    • the appellate court reversed the Probate Court's decision.
  • THE HOLDINGS
    • Section 1123(c)'s requirement that all parties to a mediated settlement agreement "expressly agree in writing . . . to its disclosure,"
      
      • may be satisfied by terms contained in a writing other than the alleged settlement agreement itself; and,
      • may be satisfied by terms contained in a writing executed before any alleged settlement agreement has purportedly been entered into.
    • Here, the Confidentiality Agreement satisfied those requirements; and,
    • The skeletal written settlement chart was enforceable because its material terms were, or could be made, certain. 
  • RATIONALE
    • Because the proceeding in which Appellant attempted to introduce the alleged settlement agreement was an action "to enforce what he claims is a settlement agreement reached in mediation," and,
    • the parties carved out of the Confidentiality Agreement any discussions that were "necessary to enforce any agreements resulting from the [mediation]"
    • the Confidentiality Agreement satisfied the requirements of section 1123(c); and,
    • the skeletal Settlement Chart was therefore admissible in evidence under that subsection.

This opinion threatens to blow a hole in sections 1119 and 1123 large enough to obliterate their protections -- protections that have been repeatedly enforced to the letter of the law by the Supreme Court in its fairly recent Fair v. Bahktiari opinion -- holding that parties to a mediated settlement agreement must include in it an express provision that they intend to be bound thereby -- and Simmons v. Ghaderi  in which the Court held that parties cannot impliedly waive confidentiality nor be estopped from asserting it.

Most Confidentiality Agreements I've seen (and used) naturally carve out an exception for the enforcement of a settlement agreement.  If you sign such an agreement after Thottam, you risk the enforcement of a non-1123-compliant "settlement agreement" and risk being required to disclose otherwise confidential mediation communications on the sole ground that one of the parties alleges that the opposition entered into an enforceable settlement agreement during the mediation.    

Were I attempting to resist the disclosure of mediation confidences my adversary claimed should be fair game under Thottam, I'd contend that the Thottam Confidentiality agreement, and hence its carve-out, was unusually broad and that the Court's holding should therefore be read narrowly and limited to its facts.  

As California lawyers know, the Second Appellate District has jurisdiction over matters litigated in the Los Angeles Superior Court.  It is therefore particularly important to take a look at the impact this decision might have upon matters mediated by the neutrals on that Court's pro bono or party pay panels.  All such parties are required to sign a Confidentiality Agreement that protects from disclosure all mediation-related "written" and "oral communication[s] made by any party, attorney, neutral, or other participant in any ADR session" except  "written settlement agreement[s] reached as a result of this ADR proceeding in an action to enforce that settlement."

Under Thottam, a colorable argument could be made that the mandatory Superior Court Agreement's confidentiality "carve-out" should be treated as either:

• an express agreement by the parties to waive confidentiality for the purpose of enforcing "written settlement agreement[s]" even if they do not satisfy the requirements of section 1123(c); and/or,
• a part of the alleged settlement agreement so that the two agreements together (confidentiality carve-out + non-compliant settlement agreement) satisfy the requirements of section 1123(c).

What to do?  Don't sign any Confidentiality agreement that could possibly be interpreted in a manner similar to the one subject of Thottam unless you want to risk the disclosure of mediation confidences arising from a writing that does not comply with section 1123(c).    

You can certainly refuse to sign the Superior Court's agreement in light of the Thottam holding.  I don't know as a matter of Court policy whether that limits parties' ability to use the Court's pro bono or party pay mediators. 

I'd have to say that this case puts confidences made in mediation sessions controlled by the Superior Court's Confidentiality Agreement at risk whenever one party is contending that the other entered into an agreement pursuant to a signed term sheet.

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The new Estate of Thottham case on the enforcement of mediated settlement agreements is troublesome because

• it appears to contravene the holding of the Supreme Court in Fair v. Bahktiari (full opinion here)
• it turns upon the interpretation of one ambiguous sentence in the parties' confidentiality agreement which I'm almost certain was not meant to create an exception to (or satisfy the requirements of) Evidence Code section 1123(c)
• it shows a remarkable persistence in the trial and appellate courts of the desire to enforce term sheets in non-compliance with the Evidence Code, privileging finality over the the parties' reasonable expectations that all the proclamations about confidentiality will be honored.  
• it creates uncertainty in the law, making it difficult for attorneys to guide their clients before, during and after mediation proceedings.

This is a ripe area for malpractice actions -- binding parties to agreements they later claim were not reached.  The Supreme Court keeps saying -- we mean what we say (Simmons v. Ghaderi) -- no exceptions to the requirements of 1123(c).  Nevertheless, the trial and appellate courts find enforcing skeletal mediation term sheets (this one was a chart) nearly irrisistable.  They just can't seem to get their minds around the idea that the point of mediation -- a non-legal process -- is to create a durable agreement that the parties all want to enforce.

If a mediated agreement were a consumer contract, there'd be a cooling down period during which the "buyers" could re-think a decision made in the heat of the moment with mediators and attorneys leaning on them to settle or else . . . . you know . . . whatever the parade of horribles is.   

Are parties bullied into settlement by mediators and even by their counsel?  Let's look again at the definition of bullying:  the repeated and deliberate abuse of power by one person or group of people over another person or group.

I'm not suggesting that mediators and attorneys know they are abusing the power of their position and authority to "persuade" the parties to accept a settlement that leaves the taste of injustice in their mouths.  We just sometimes forget how much power we possess and how overwhelming our importuning can feel to someone unfamiliar with the legal system.  Think about how helpless you feel trying to communicate with someone who speaks another language.

I've observed mediations in which the mediator -- repeatedly and, it can only be said, deliberately -- abuses his or her authority to gain the consent of parties who are clearly not comfortable with settling their case on the terms proposed and are certainly not satisified with the "deal."

Keep 'em in the room; wear them out; highlight their fears; diminish their hopes and then, when they're at their weakest, put a pen in their hand, ask them to sign and then elevate that signed agreement above all else because what we're after here is efficiency, brother, not justice -- a term too many mediators feel forced to put in quotes.  "Justice."  As if it could possibly be anything other than a cynical joke.

OK.  I misused this post to rant.

I'm going to come back and "brief" this case for you next, highlighting the traps for the unwary and commenting on the form agreement used by the Los Angeles Superior Court ADR panel -- a form that is now mandatory.

HEAD'S UP FOR THE NEXT POST NEW LAW STUDENTS -- THIS IS WHY IT'S IMPORTANT TO LEARN HOW TO DE-CONSTRUCT A LEGAL DECISION AND TEASE OUT THE HOLDING FROM THE RATIONALE, THE RULES AND THE DICTA. 

This Met News report, accurate as it is, doesn't do justice to the traps and troubles lurking here.

Evidence Code Sec. 1123(c)'s exception to mediation confidentiality--providing that a written settlement agreement prepared in mediation is not made inadmissible or protected from disclosure if signed by parties, and all parties expressly agree in writing to disclosure--applied in appellant's civil action to enforce chart prepared during mediation and signed by all parties which appellant claimed was a settlement agreement because estate beneficiaries, in agreement to mediate dispute over distribution of assets, agreed all matters discussed or agreed to in mediation would be kept confidential and not used in any litigation among them "except as may be necessary to enforce any agreements resulting from" mediation, and because chart--setting forth material terms which were sufficiently certain to provide a basis for determining what obligations to which parties had agreed--was a "settlement agreement."

Estate of Thottam - filed August 13, 2008, Second District, Div. Four Cite as 2008 SOS 4917
 

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(image:  Le Silence O Redon)

In today's Daily Journal, reporter Greg Katz writes  that DESPITE RULES, NEUTRALS ARE RARELY BLAMED WHEN THEY MEDIATE AND TELL.

"What happens," asks Katz, "when a mediator is accused of breaking mediation confidentiality, the thing many mediators say is essential to their craft?"

The answer: probably nothing.

As Katz reports, the Simmons v. Ghaderi opinion that made mediation confidentiality iron-clad, arose from a mediation in which the neutral provided a sworn declaration to the Court reciting "details about [his attempt] to persuade Ghaderi to sign her consent," among other things.  

Ron Kelly, an architect of the state's confidentiality statutes, opined that the Declaration filed by the mediator in the Simmons case breached "Evidence Code Section 1121, which forbids mediators, in most instances, from reporting to the courts anything that takes place in their mediations."  Kelly concluded by saying,

If you were going to go after a mediator for malpractice, it seems like an open-and-shut case of violating the law would be a good start, don't you think?

Yes I do.  Yet local attorneys and mediators seem unconcerned.  Lucie Baron of ADR Services told Katz that her panel of neutrals had no policy on the matter because the mediators -- after all -- are attorneys and independent contractors to boot.  They don't, she noted, ask her for legal advice. 

Not a bad call on Baron's part.  But what about the neutrals? 

Their lack of attention to the spectre of "open-and-shut" malpractice litigation is perplexing.  Though the Simmons mediator could colorably claim that the law of confidentiality was unsettled at the time he submitted his declaration -- or that the factual scenario before him permitted the disclosures made -- in a post-Simmons environment, neutrals cannot be so sanguine.  Any disclosure of any communications during a mediation by the neutral would likely be actionable so long as it caused one of the litigants appreciable harm.     

When someone is unhappy with a result -- as too many litigants of mediated settlements are /* -- they search the field for people to blame. 

So far, mediators haven't been among the potential culprits.   

I wouldn't count on that situation lasting much longer.

_____________________

*/  More on this topic soon.

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Update:  there's a good discussion of the holding and rationale at the Complex Litigator -- Simmons v. Ghaderi: mediation privilege trumps allegation of oral settlement agreement here.

I'm re-posting this "how to" now that Simmons v. Ghaderi has been decided.  You no longer have even a fighting chance of enforcing a mediated settlement agreement that fails to comply with the Code.  So here's the procedure, as recommended by my and Deborah Rothman's article in the Daily Journal in November 2006 -- Take Steps to Ensure that Mediated Settlement Agreements Can Be Enforced. 

Assuming your client insists on orally memorializing the settlement reached in mediation, you must comply strictly with Evidence Code Sections 1118 and 1124. An oral agreement reached during a mediation can be proven and enforced only if (1) its terms are recited to a court reporter or recorded by a sound device in the presence of all parties and the mediator, (2) the parties expressly agree to those terms on the record, (3) the recording is reduced to writing and signed within 72 hours of its recordation and (4) all parties to the agreement expressly agree in a writing, in the sound recording or in the reported record that the signed written transcript may be disclosed.

Th[e] procedure for enforcing an oral settlement is so technical and cumbersome . . . (counsel and mediators rarely have court reporters standing by or tape recorders in their breast pockets), that we recommend against it.

We instead suggest that the parties document all settlements in writing, even if the writing contains only skeletal deal terms and even if someone has to begin drafting it at 2 a.m. The agreement should provide that the parties intend it to be enforceable or binding and that all parties expressly agree in writing to its disclosure. . . . If an action is pending between the parties, the memorandum of understanding should be made enforceable under Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6.

See also the Supreme Court's decision in Fair v. Bhaktiari, interpreting the phrase "words to that effect" in section 1123(b) as requiring a written mediated settlement agreement to "directly express the parties’ agreement to be bound by the document they sign."

Almost right will not do.  You must strictly comply with these provisions or your mediated settlement agreement will not be enforceable.

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Today, the Supreme Court handed down a unanimous ruling in the long-awaited Simmons v. Ghaderi case about which I've commented on many occasions -- both on the importance of the confidentiality laws the Supreme Court held were air-tight today and on the process itself as a common example of a failed mediation proceeding.

Highlights from the opinion:

• "The Legislature chose to promote mediation by ensuring confidentiality rather than adopt a scheme to ensure good behavior in the mediation and litigation process."
• [T]he legislative history of the mediation confidentiality statutes as a whole reflects a desire that section 1115 et seq. be strictly followed in the interest of efficiency. By laying down clear rules, the Legislature intended to reduce litigation over the admissibility and disclosure of evidence regarding settlements and communications that occur during mediation. (citation omitted).  Allowing courts to craft judicial exceptions to the statutory rules would run counter to that intent."
• In Foxgate,  we reasoned we "were bound to respect the Legislature’s policy choice to protect mediation confidentiality rather than create a procedure that encouraged good faith participation in mediation. Thus, we held that evidence of a party’s bad faith during the mediation may not be admitted or considered." 

Here's the appellate decision that was reversed on nearly every ground raised in Justice Aldrich's compellingly well-reasoned dissent.

Here are our previous commentaries:

Take Steps to Ensure Mediation Agreements Can Be Enforced (co-authored by local arbitrator and mediator Deborah Rothman, first published in the Daily Journal)

You Say Waiver, I Say Estoppel, Let's Call the Whole Thing Wrong -- Another Look at Simmons v. Ghaderi  

If I Settle, It Will Mean that I Killed Her -- Anatomy of a Failed Medical Malpractice Mediation, at the National Institute for Advanced Conflict Resolution

Here's a veiw that opposes my own -- Kirk Pasich Replies:  the Mediation Privilege and Bad Faith Carrier Conduct.

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Bob Hunt over at Realty Times has a nice consumer-friendly article entitled Californa Court Holds That Mediation Provision "Means What It Says".  /*

As Hunt writes, 

The standard residential purchase contract in California is produced by the California Association of Realtors® (CAR). It contains two sections that are easy to overlook or to take as “boilerplate”, but that can be very important if things go awry between the parties. One of those sections deals with attorney fees, providing that, in the event of any proceeding between buyer and seller, the prevailing party shall be entitled to attorney fees and costs from the non-prevailing party. The attorney fee section contains an exception, however, and that exception is spelled out in the portion of the contract referring to mediation. There it is said that, if either party initiates an action “without first attempting to resolve the matter through mediation, or refuses to mediate after a request has been made, then that party shall not be entitled to recover attorney fees… .” [my emphasis] /*

When Mr. Thrifty and I purchased our house in '02, we were presented with one of these form contracts.  I'm a lazy form contract signator myself.  Negotiation training or not, I generally assume these contracts are "take it or leave it" and I sign them accordingly.  /**

Not Mr. Thrifty.

"What's the procedure?"  I recall him pressing our real estate agent.    "When is the demand for mediation supposed to be made and how are the parties supposed to conduct it and what happens if the parties can't reach agreement on the mediator to conduct the process?"

He was having none of it. 

"I'm crossing it out," he said, as blue ink flowed over the mediation provision and our agent let out of small gasp of dismay.

By that time, everyone was so "bought in" to the sale, that Mr. Thrifty's effort to strike  the form language prevailed.  No mediation necessary in this household!

Beware of Form Contract Language

As Bob Hunt explains, the Lange Court gave the back of its hand to the contention that it was "too difficult" to make the required demand for mediation.  

“If the [sellers] could be found and served with a lawsuit by mail, they could have been sent a mediation demand by mail[,]” [held the Court]  All that the plaintiff had to do was attempt to mediate before he filed suit; and he didn't. Quoting a related case, the court noted that the mediation provision “means what it says and will be enforced.” 

Though it's not surprising to find bare bones ADR provisions in industry form contracts -- bones so bear that their meaning must be litigated -- defeating the purpose of the summary proceedings provided for -- it is surprising to find attorneys continuing to paste form contract language into their client's negotiated agreements.  This is particularly troublesome when what's at stake -- the attorneys' fees -- makes the difference between bringing litigation or not or settling litigation or not.

If it's worth putting a clause into your contract, it's worth spending the time to imagine what might happen if circumstances triggering that clause arise.  If you're practicing in a firm with both transactional and litigation attorneys, I highly recommend that the wordsmiths run the "standard" ADR, attorney fee, choice of law, and venue provisions by the litigators who have undoubtedly already tested these provisions in the fire of conflict.  You won't be sorry you did.       

_______________________

*/  The case -- Lange v. Schilling -- was originally ordered not not to be published.  Had that Order stood, the case would not create precedent under California law.  As the reader of the linked opinion can see, however, it was subsequently ordered published and can be cited as authority. 

**/  The form contract language at issue reads as follows:

Buyer and Seller agree to mediate any dispute or claim arising between them out of this Agreement, or any resulting transaction, before resorting to arbitration or court action. . . . If, for any dispute or claim to which this paragraph applies, any party commences an action without first attempting to resolve the matter through mediation, or refuses to mediate after a request has been made, then that party shall not be entitled to recover attorney fees, even if they would otherwise be available to that party in any such action.

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Head's up insurance carriers and their counsel!

Noting the benefits of appellate mediation and the desirability of participants attending in person, a California appellate court warned insurers in Campagnone v. Enjoyable Pools & Spas that even the potential of coverage requires a representative with full settlement authority to attend court-ordered appellate mediations in person, unless excused in writing by the mediator. Further, the court warned parties and counsel that they may also face sanctions if they fail to notify insurers with potential coverage about appellate mediations. The court noted that California’s strict mediation confidentiality provisions prevent mediators from disclosing whether anyone fails to attend, but that an aggrieved party may do so in seeking sanctions from the court. The court withheld sanctions in this case only because no previous opinion had spelled out these requirements, even though the insurer was only liable for amounts in excess of $3 million and the judgment in the trial court was $2.4 million.

Campagnone v. Enjoyable Pools & Spas, No. C055050 (Cal. App.3d Dist., May 30, 2008)


Thanks to Keith Seat Mediation Newsletter for the case.

And thanks to arbitrator and mediator extraordinaire Deborah Rothman for passing this along to me.  (speaking of gender politics, Deborah graduated with the first class of women to be admitted to Yale University)

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by Michael D. Young, whose recently posted Mediation Gone Wild Document Repository Web Pages you absolutely MUST SEE!

Once again, the trial courts are trying to mess up mediation confidentiality by judicially creating (legislating?) exceptions to the confidentiality statutes. When faced with a public policy that competes with California's strong public policy favoring mediation confidentiality, the trial courts too often seem to tip the balance the wrong way by inventing unwritten exceptions to the law. Luckily, in the recently-penned decision in Wimsatt v. Superior Court (Kausch) (Cal. App. No. B196903), the appellate court fixed things up...although it was clearly not happy about it.

Wimsatt involves a legal malpractice action against a prominent plaintiff's personal injury firm. In the trial court, the former client and malpractice plaintiff claimed that the law firm "breached its fiduciary duty by significantly lowering [the client's] settlement demand without his knowledge or consent." The client claimed he first learned of this fact from the confidential mediation brief that was provided to the mediator. You can see the public policy conflict already, can't you?

In the malpractice action, the client reasonably enough wants to obtain and introduce the smoking gun mediation brief, the one on which his entire case rests. However, as California practitioners should know by now, there is a slight problem with the plaintiff's wish: Evidence Code Sections 1115 et seq., and in particular Section 1119. California is serious, and rightfully so, about protecting the very cornerstone of mediation -- confidentiality. Under Section 1119, no mediation communications, including mediation briefs, are admissible in court. This has been reaffirmed time and time again by the Supreme Court (go reread Foxgate and Rojas if you don't believe me).

So what happened in the Wimsatt case? According to the opinion, in the underlying personal injury lawsuit, the client's lawyer made a comment to the personal injury defense counsel that it might be more appropriate to discuss settlement in the $1.5 million range rather than the $3.5 million range they had been discussing before. Because of this comment, claimed the client, he was forced to settle his personal injury case at mediation for an amount that was much less than the case was worth. Despite agreeing to the mediated settlement, the client brought a malpractice claim against his attorneys claiming he could have done better if only....

Continue Reading...

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(photo:  Silence is Golden by Memme)

Just when you say the mediation privilege would prevent the parties from disclosing such matters as settlement authority and the activities of party representatives, along comes an out-of-state federal opinion that makes you glad you live and practice in California.

Although the District Court in Bauerlein v. Equity Residential Properties Management Corp.Slip Copy, 2007 WL 1521606D.Ariz.,2007.May 22, 2007 refused to award the costs of an unsuccessful mediation against parties whose representatives left the mediation "early" there was nary a word spoken about confidentiality of the proceedings.

Arizona and Federal Protections for Confidential Mediation Communications  

It's not that Arizona doesn't have such a privilege.  We understand that A.R.S. § 12-2238 recognizes as privileged and confidential "[c]ommunications made, materials created for or used and acts occurring during a mediation." (emphasis added).

Nor do the federal courts lack protections for mediation communications.  Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 652(d), mediations conducted pursuant to federal court ADR programs are required to be protected by local rules, which "provide for the confidentiality of the alternative dispute resolution processes and to prohibit disclosure of confidential dispute resolution communications." 

Therefore, whether protected by federal or state law, you would have expected that the parties accused of conducting themselves in "bad faith' would have objected to the introduction into evidence of one or all of the following mediation communications and activities:  

• the identity of carrier representatives attending;
• when and why those representatives left the mediation; 
• the mediator's or the parties' explanation of the reason for the representatives departures, i.e., because there was a "vast divergence of the estimates of the value of the claims"
• why one party put no money whatsoever on the table (because it was essentially judgment proof as a Taiwanese corporation without any U.S. holdings")
• the mediator's statement to at least one of the carrier representatives that the case would not settle "based on the parties' individual evaluations of the claims because they were too far apart and had too divergent estimates of the value of their claims"
• the mediator's approval of the carrier representatives leaving the mediation so long as counsel was left with authority to settle the claims.

Mediator Predictions

I don't know what shocks me more.  That these disclosures were made with no objection or that the mediator "predicted" the case would not settle before the parties "officially" reached impasse.  These predictions invariably affect the negotiations and should be made rarely if at all.  

Just as importantly, attorneys mediating their disputes should familiarize themselves with the laws applicable to the confidentiality of the proceedings -- particularly when they're in federal court where the applicable law is not as certain as it is in the state courts.  See the following commentaries on the federal Northern District of California Olam opinion (largely disapproved in California) here and here.   

It's my experience that most attorneys are completely unaware of the scope and nature of the mediation privilege under which they are operating.  If we don't want this inexpensive "alternative" procedure to become a breeding ground for litigation over party mediation tactics, then we should make sure we learn, and follow, the applicable mediation protections, privileges and guidelines less we stumble into disclosures that need not be made.   See Disputing Irony, a Systematic Look at Litigation about Mediation

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Thanks to Diana Skaggs of the Kentucky Divorce Law Journal for alerting us to the Kentucky Law Blog's post Court of Appeal Affirms Trial Court's Award of Mediation Fees for Party Failing to Attend

Here in California, and I suspect in many other states, the Court cannot sanction "bad faith" negotiations because all of the parties' communications at a mediation are confidential.

I've often had attorneys ask me, however, whether they can bring to the Court's attention the fact that a claims adjuster, for instance, did not "show" at the mediation.  Can't they seek sanctions for that "bad faith" they ask.    

This is the question the Ky Law Blog asks and answers today under Louisiana law as interpreted in a nonpublished appellate opinion, Sullivan v. Anderson.  In that case, writes attorney and blogger Michael Stevens,

the defendant's attorney . . . arranged for the date, time, location, and mediator and notifed the pro se litigant who did nothing.

[A]ffirming [the trial court] . . . a Jefferson Circuit Court . . . held that although a party was not obligated to attend the "agreed" upon mediation, he was obligated to notify the other side he would not attend so as not to waste the mediator's time. . . [The appellate court opined]

We agree with [the pro per plaintiff] Sullivan and the trial court that Sullivan was not obligated to attend the mediation since it was not ordered by the court. However, [defense counsel] did not have any reason to know that the parties had not agreed on mediation since Sullivan did not inform her that he did not agree to the arranged mediator and mediation date. [*]

 A Kentucky court “may invoke its inherent power to impose attorney's fees and related expenses on a party as a sanction for bad faith conduct, regardless of the existence of statutory authority or remedial rules.” (citations omitted).

The Parade of "Bad Faith" Mediation Horribles

Mr. Stevens justifiably marches out the following parade of horribles that this opinion could lead to, such as awards of sanctions when:   

• the insurance defense lawyer shows up at mediation without the adjuster or the insured and rel[ies] upon the adjuster's attendance by telephone[;]
• the adjuster in attendance . . . not hav[ing] settlement authority extending to the policy limits[;]
• the adjuster ha[ving] to leave early[; and,]
• the adjuster with higher authority [not being] available by phone, or . . . delays in contacting the adjuster by telephone[.]

Are Sanctions Available in California for "Bad Faith" Mediation Practices?

California's mediation privilege is codified in Evidence Code sections 1115 et seq.  As most California practitioners are well aware, our Supreme Court has strictly construed these provisions.     

Because Evidence Code section 1120 expressly exempts any "agreement to mediate a dispute" from the protections of section 1119, a California court could presumably sanction a party for failing to appear at an agreed upon (or court ordered) mediation.  

Here in California, however, an award of such sanctions presumably could not include all or part of the mediator's fee because our Supreme Court has held that a party may not be ordered to pay a private mediator in the first instance.     

Moreoever, a party''s mediation conduct, such as a defendant's failure to bring a claims adjuster or the plaintiff's attorneys failure to bring his client, would not likely subject either party to sanctions.  

Section  1119(c) prohibits a party from disclosing "[a]ll . . . negotiations . . by and between the participants in the course of a mediation or a mediation consultation."  Interpreting this section broadly and strictly as our Supreme Court requires would likely result in the denial of sanctions because the choice of individuals to represent party interests is an integral part of the "negotiation" between the parties.  **     

Finally, section 1119(a) most certainly forecloses an award of sanctions based upon offers made or not made during -- or authority possessed or not possessed at -- a mediation.  Those facts could only be learned as a result of something "said . . . for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to a mediation" and therefore fall squarely within section 1119(a).    

_________________

**  We find this one of the strangest and most illogical formulations we've heard from any appellate court anytime, anywhere -- a dangerous one at that -- and contrary to the law of contracts.  Since when does an agreement exist when party A proposes X to party B, who does not respond?  Since when is an agreement formed when party B neither accepts nor rejects it?   

*** The American Heritage Dictionary (2000) defines the verb "to negotiate" to mean and include, inter alia, "[t]o arrange or settle by discussion and mutual agreement: negotiate a contract."    

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We've been following the case of Simmons v. Ghaderi since the opinion appeared in October of last year.  The case went up to the California Supreme Court for review in December '06. The issue, as defined by Dr. Ghaderi is:     

whether there can be an enforceable settlement agreement when all evidence upon which it is based is inadmissible under the mediation statutes. 

As our previous commentary on this case indicates, we believe this accurately states the matter at issue and the source of the lower court's error.   That commentary, along with a mediation analysis using the Simmons' facts as a hypothetical, can be found here, here and here.  

I'm supplying you with the reply brief only.  (and adding the recently posted CDRC Amicus Brief here)

Once upon a time (at least 20 years ago) a Superior Court Judge confided in me that if s/he were overwhelmed with work and facing a calendar call, s/he would read the reply brief only "because it contained all the arguments." 

YIKES!! 

This did considerably alter my briefing habits. 

Here the Reply covers most of the arguments in the Opening Brief and the responses to the Opposition, which I haven't seen.  If anyone wants to send it along to me, I'll post it too.

 

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Appellate opinions concerning the enforceability of mediated settlement agreements are coming fast and furious.

If you haven't prepared your form term sheets and memoranda of understanding by now,  you might end up litigating the settlement whose purpose it was to stop the litigation. 

Oh the irony!    

Today's case Irvine v. Regents of University of California (4th Dist. 2007) was decided on a narrow procedural ground, leaving at large the questions of fraud, duress and mistake alleged by the Plaintiff as a bar to enforcement of her mediated settlement agreement.

The narrow issue here was whether a party could be excused from meeting the deadlines imposed by California Rule of Court 3.1385 simply by asserting that the challegned settlement agreement was uneforceable. 

The Irvine Court, reversing the trial court's Rule 3.1385 dismissal, answered the question in the affirmative, explaining: 

The only decision before the court at a rule 3.1385 hearing is whether to dismiss the case or restore it to the civil active list. By alleging a dispute over whether the parties reached a binding settlement, plaintiff demonstrated good cause to restore the case to the civil active list. In reaching this conclusion, we have not considered whether any of plaintiff's contentions have merit.

There you have it.  Now the parties will be litigating the compromise they reached to avoid litigation.  Don't let this happen to you.  Start (but do not finish) here, where I have provided articles and case law bearing upon the enforceability of mediated settlement agreements. 

If you want your agreements to be durable take the time to read the case law, check the statutory provisions and, yes, even read the Rules, like 3.1385 here, which requires that an action be dismissed within 45 days after the Court receives notice of settlement unless good cause is shown why the case should not be dismissed.

 

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We've talked before about complaints that mediators sometimes use time- authority- and fear-pressure tactics to wrest agreement from the parties. 

If a client can prove she was coerced into settling a Title VII case, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California has a remedy for her -- rescission.  

As reported last year by the National Arbitration Forum, the Court In Ryles v. Palace Hotel, rescinded a mediated settlement agreement as violative of federal law governing the release of Title VII claims.  The release of such claims must be “voluntary, deliberate, and informed.”

As the National Arbitration Forum article explained

In applying that standard, courts must consider the “totality of the circumstances.” The factors to be considered include the clarity of the agreement, the claimant’s education and business experience, whether the atmosphere for the execution of the agreement was coercive, and whether the plaintiff had the benefit of counsel.

All but one of those factors favored enforcement. However, one of the factors – whether the atmosphere for the execution of the agreement was coercive – weighed heavily against enforcement because of the “intense pressure” applied by Ryles’ attorney. Based on that factor, the Court held that Ryles could rescind the settlement agreement.

In reaching its holding, the Court cited Ryles’ letter to the Court as bolstering her credibility. Moreover, the Court rejected Palace Hotel’s argument that California law required coercion by the other party to the contract, noting that the release of Title VII claims is governed by federal law.

More on mediation "duress" soon.

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The Supreme Court has defined the issue before it in Simmons v. Ghaderi after its December 20, 2006, grant of review as follows:   

This case presents the following issue: In an action to determine whether a valid oral settlement agreement was formed during mediation, was one party estopped to claim confidentiality for the mediation proceedings (Evid. Code, sections 1115-1124) because she had voluntarily declared the facts to be true, stipulated that she did not dispute them, submitted evidence of them, and litigated their effect for more than a year?

See our own previous commentary on this case here, here and here.

 

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Provision in real estate purchase agreement disallowing attorney fees to a prevailing party who did not first attempt mediation did not preclude award of fees incurred to defend the action.  In any event, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's implied finding that defendant's offer to mediate was rebuffed by plaintiff.  Van Slyke v. Gibson  (January 18, 2007, Second District, Div. Six)  Cite as 2007 SOS 311

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The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District held in Jeld-Wen v. Superior Court today that parties may not be ordered to attend and pay for the private mediation of complex litigation.

After a thorough review of the law applicable to the appointment (and pay) of referees for the purpose of settlement conferences and discovery disputes, the Fourth District held

While trial courts may try to cajole the parties in complex actions into stipulating to private mediation (see Super. Ct. San Diego County, Local Rules, rule 2.3.7), they cannot be forced or coerced over the threat of sanctions into attending and paying for private mediation as this is antithetical to the entire concept of mediation. In any event, we suspect that in a large majority of complex cases most parties will agree to private mediation; as such, we foresee no apocalyptic consequences from this decision.

The case is worth reading for its coverage of the differences between mandatory settlement conferences and mediation, as well as the scope of the Court's authority to require the parties to pay a retired judge or mediator for the proceedings.

 

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 The California Supreme Court held in Fair v. Bahktiari last week that parties to a mediated settlement agreement must include an express provision that they intend to be bound by any written term sheet memorializing their settlement.

If you do not, the trial court will not enforce your settlement agreement even when, as here, you've prepared a relatively detailed deal memo including an arbitration clause.

As we've recommended before, you should prepare your term sheets in advance (or better yet, bring a laptop with your form settlement agreement on it --  many of my clients do, along with a portable printer or a jump drive to plug into a local PC). 

Being prepared to draw up the settlement agreement at the mediation is not only "a stitch in time" but shows admirable optimism.  Optimism that does, believe it or not, have a real and substantial effect on the settlement proceedings.   

For tips on ways to insure that your mediated settlement agreements are enforceable (or to resist the enforcement of an "agreement" that you don't concede was actually reached) see Deborah Rothman's and my Daily Journal article on the topic here.

Continue Reading...

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(left:  Bansky! as shot by Goatgirl:  it says:   . . . for silence is a fragile thing . . . )

Silence (confidentiality) in mediation is what makes mediation possible; what permits the parties to take time out from the battlefield where everything we say and every move we make can and will be used against us.   

Private, confidential mediation time is a time when the parties can come together as people rather than as combatants.  And this is true no matter how many zeros follow the first number by which they identify the "value" of their dispute (it could be land or women or rubies; furs or hunting grounds; fishing rights or that most evanescent of properties  -- the product of the creative human spirit -- music, poetry, film, video, web cam.) 

Mediation time is a time when the law allows people to recognize that they share a mutual problem, one that yokes them together.  It is a time when they can give up carrying the conflict's burden alone and recognize that by drilling a hole in the other guy's side of the boat, they will sink their own.

On the other hand, silence and secrets are death to the spirit.  The terrible tragedy of the evangelical minister who was finally unable to keep his sexual preference silent is a good example for World AIDS Day.  The magnitude of the tragedy following his public "outing" makes the word "preference" seem weak and far too, well, preferential, as if one were ordering a meal in a restaurant or choosing a new suit of clothes.  We are, I hear, only as sick as our secrets.

But the digression seems to have become the entire post.  I nevertheless stick with my original plan to pass along, from the ADR Forum, the holding of the below-referenced appellate opinion on the mediation privilege in the context of an arbitration For the World AIDS Day page, click here.  For the (red) campaign and a video message from Bono, click here

from the National Arbitration Forum 

Confidentiality Protections Apply to Hybrid Procedure Consisting of Arbitration and Mediation
Society of Lloyd's v. Moore, No. 1:06-CV-286, 2006 WL 3167735 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 1, 2006)
11/1/2006

A federal district court in Ohio ruled that the confidentiality protections of the Uniform Mediation Act applied to an email sent during the mediation phase of a hybrid dispute resolution procedure that first started with arbitration.

In Society of Lloyd's v. Moore, No. 1:06-CV-286, 2006 WL 3167735 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 1, 2006), Lloyd's sued Moore for alleged fraud. After the Court granted partial summary judgment, the parties agreed to submit the remaining matters to arbitration and mediation...Full Story  

Subscribe to the Free ADR Law & Policy Update here.

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I'm providing this legal update without myself reading the opinion, for which I've provided a link.  I must admit that the summary sent to me is perplexing.  I will read this case when I have the time and will update this post at that time.  If anyone wants to beat me to it and explain the holding in a comment, please do feel free to do so.  That said, here's the summary:  

California Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 410.42 renders null and void any provision in a construction contract "which purports to require any dispute between the parties to be litigated, arbitrated, or otherwise determined outside this state" where the construction project is located in California.

In the recent case of Templeton Development Corporation v. Superior Court (Dick Emard Electric, Inc.) (2006 SOS 5560) the Third District Court of Appeal held that section 410.42 nullifies a contractual provision requiring that parties to a construction dispute mediate outside California as a prerequisite to arbitration or litigation over their dispute.

Where defendant contractor refused to mediate in California, plaintiff subcontractor was not precluded from suing subject to stay so that action could be mediated or arbitrated in this state.

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