It's common to blame your lawyer when dispute management goes awry in the executive suite, even when the client is former Time, Inc. EOC, Norman Pearlstine (book here and Senate testimony here) and the attorney is "[o]ne of America's most ferocious defenders of the First Amendment, Floyd Abrams."
In today's NYTimes, Adam Liptak reviews Pearlstine's public charge that Abrams "gave [Time] less good advice than [it] deserved" in responding to subpoenas issued by the Special Prosecutor during his investigation into the disclosure of CIA operative Valerie Plame Wilson's identity. (For the full article, see Editor’s Charge: His Lawyer Fell Short).
Though not agreeing with Pearlstine's evaluation of Abrams' motives -- that he was "more focused on overturning Branzburg v. Hayes . . . reject[ing] First Amendment protection for confidential sources, 'than on pragmatic ways in which [Time] might fashion a compromise' - Liptak concurs with Pearlstine's "broader point" that
Time, like The Times, seems to have misplayed its hand. While it is impossible to know if the two news organizations and their reporters could have found a way to respond to [congressional subpoenas] short of a constitutional battle royale, it seems pretty clear that they could have tried harder to look for a compromise. . . . Time’s fundamental misstep was its astonishing failure to approach Mr. Rove for permission to cooperate in the investigation."
Zealous Advocates and Negotiation Pros
No matter how complicated a game of football subject to Monday morning quarter-backing might be, it pales in comparison to the immensely complex and sophisticated commercial and legal strategies that must be planned, launched and managed in response to a Congressional subpoena (and yes we have grappled with the monster for our pro bono clients).
But the purpose of this comment is not to call into question either Mr. Abrams' legal advice or Mr. Liptak's belief that the decision not to approach Mr. Rove for permission to cooperate in the investigation constituted an "astonishing failure."
Rather, we ask ourselves and our readers again whether there ought not be a representational "balance of powers" when the legal, professional, societal, political and commercial stakes are so high.
We lawyers do like to represent ourselves as Jacks of all trades -- negotiating a settlement here; drafting a compelling appellate brief there; cross-examining a witness within an inch of his life today and strategizing a long-term legal and commercial strategy in response to a thermo-nuclear patent infringement action the following week.
But, really. We're just not all 100% top-of-the-class, flat-out brilliant at everything.
When a client wants a zealous advocate, willing to burn the enemy's crops for a litigation advantage, he's not likely to also get Mr. International Diplomacy in the bargain. One General Counsel once told me that her (Fortune 50) Company didn't let the litigators and trial attorneys "in" on the overall plan, particularly settlement strategy, because they wanted them to be combat-ready at all times.
The Interdisciplinary Approach to Bet-the-Company Litigation
Once again we're recommending an interdisciplinary response to litigation, particularly when the enterprise's survival or the survival of its fundamental principles are at stake.
Whether or not you'll want to hire an outside settlement team, you'll definitely need a strategic planning in-house negotiation guru to do that which "one of America's most ferocious defenders of the First Amendment" shouldn't be expected to do.
We will say it again and again. Litigation is a business negotiation being conducted in the courts. The litigators need to be focused on the law; the parties' positions; legal strategy; and, most importantly, that which they do supremely well for a living -- WINNING.
Business, however, is not a legal negotiation being conducted in commerce. It is a multi-faceted enterprise with commercial (as well as societal and political) interests that can be advanced or deterred by the quality of its management.
When you need a negotiator to approach the likes of Carl Rove, you do not ask Floyd Abrams to do it. You find a lawyer or a political ally who is skilled at working Washington relationships. No matter how masterful the litigator, s/he is not in charge of the war, only one of its many battles.
CEO's who blame the lawyers on their watch for strategic missteps are missing the point. Lawyers are commercial foot soldiers -- some skilled at flying B-52's; others at triaging the wounded; and a few, very few, at planning the grand strategy to take a City or withdraw from it with honor.
The lawyer, no matter his credentials, is a member of the team and should be deployed by the CEO as best suits his or her skill, education, experience, talent and drive.
As Sun Tzu instructs in The Art of War,
A sovereign of high character and intelligence must be able to know the right man, should place the responsibility on him, and expect results.