Negotiation Law Blog - Michael Webster's Resolution to the Shubik Dollar Auction Game - Comments http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/ Southern California Arbitration Mediation & Conflict Resolution: Settle it Now Dispute Resolution Services: Serving Los Angeles, Beverly Hills, Century City en Copyright 2012 Fri, 23 Mar 2012 01:07:14 -0800 Fri, 23 Mar 2012 01:07:14 -0800 http://www.sixapart.com/movabletype/?v=4.32-en http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss Michael Webster Thank-you for posting the link.

But, I don't think that the correct metaphor is "cooler heads". I may be wrong, and frequently am, but I see these problems as types of illusions: in the dollar auction game, there is the illusion that there can be no joint gain.

The bigger issue here is whether the experienced mediators, which I am not, find value in revisiting the standard mediation training devices or games using my methodology: look for joint gains, and then for commitment devices which ensure that everyone will do their part. Those commitment devices are unlikely to nash equilibrium or best response to a best response.

A nash equilibrium is the type of strategy a person who was playing solitaire would use: no other people, just us playing cards. (Without at all diminishing my respect for Nash and game theorists in general for their intellectual achievement, I think that real life conflict resolution is far edgier than the calm offered by the nash solution - where it doesn't matter what the other player does.

]]> http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/conflict-resolution/michael-websters-resolution-to-the-shubik-dollar-auction-game/#22132 http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/conflict-resolution/michael-websters-resolution-to-the-shubik-dollar-auction-game/#22132 CollaborationConflict ResolutionDeal MakingMediationMoneyNegotiationNegotiation Strategy and TacticsSettlementSocial Psychology Wed, 24 Oct 2007 23:33:22 -0800 Victoria Pynchon Vickie In my mediation experience, people have to cool down before they're able to recognize that looking for joint gains is a smart thing to do. They enter mediation angry and looking for an advantage because they don't want to be taken advantage of. They don't WANT to look for joint gains when they're in this state of mind. They're looking to WIN.

]]> http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/conflict-resolution/michael-websters-resolution-to-the-shubik-dollar-auction-game/#22133 http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/conflict-resolution/michael-websters-resolution-to-the-shubik-dollar-auction-game/#22133 CollaborationConflict ResolutionDeal MakingMediationMoneyNegotiationNegotiation Strategy and TacticsSettlementSocial Psychology Wed, 24 Oct 2007 23:33:22 -0800 Victoria Pynchon Michael Webster Vickie; That is very interesting. I wonder if there is some biological link between anger and the inability to see the solution to these type of puzzles? I think that there was something back awhile on your site referencing testorone levels and play in the ultimatum game.

]]> http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/conflict-resolution/michael-websters-resolution-to-the-shubik-dollar-auction-game/#22134 http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/conflict-resolution/michael-websters-resolution-to-the-shubik-dollar-auction-game/#22134 CollaborationConflict ResolutionDeal MakingMediationMoneyNegotiationNegotiation Strategy and TacticsSettlementSocial Psychology Wed, 24 Oct 2007 23:33:22 -0800 Victoria Pynchon Ben If the first bidder agreed not to bid again, then the second bidder would be up $20 (-2 to 18), so why shouldn't the first bidder demand $19.99 not to bid again? If the second player refused the first player could up his bid to $20, netting zero and forcing player 2 to take a $2 loss.

]]> http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/conflict-resolution/michael-websters-resolution-to-the-shubik-dollar-auction-game/#22135 http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/conflict-resolution/michael-websters-resolution-to-the-shubik-dollar-auction-game/#22135 CollaborationConflict ResolutionDeal MakingMediationMoneyNegotiationNegotiation Strategy and TacticsSettlementSocial Psychology Wed, 24 Oct 2007 23:33:22 -0800 Victoria Pynchon Vickie Pynchon It's not testosterone (as far as I know). It's about freeing the brain's higher cognitive centers from the primitive operations of the flight/fight mechanism centered in the amygdala.

My friend Ken Cloke likes to begin his mediation training sessions by saying, "look around the room. What do you see? . . . beat . . . PRIMATES."

We LOVE to think that we're rational but we're not.

The only chance we have to think as rationally as we are able is to free ourselves of as much fear and anger as we can without rendering ourselves defenseless against predators.

Then we can use our higher cognitive functions to do the kind of math that Ben and you suggest.

As in all things, it's all about balance.

]]> http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/conflict-resolution/michael-websters-resolution-to-the-shubik-dollar-auction-game/#22136 http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/conflict-resolution/michael-websters-resolution-to-the-shubik-dollar-auction-game/#22136 CollaborationConflict ResolutionDeal MakingMediationMoneyNegotiationNegotiation Strategy and TacticsSettlementSocial Psychology Wed, 24 Oct 2007 23:33:22 -0800 Victoria Pynchon Michael Webster Ben; You are correct, the solution I proposed is not a nash equilbrium. Just as reasonable people play the ultimatum game differently than economists, so should they play this game differently. If the first player demanded $19.99 to not bid and then bid $20.00, if refused. The second player can also be "pissed" and bid $21. My solution calls for the first bidder to credibly commit to not bidding, which I think he can do by pushing a $10 spot across the table.

Vickie; I think that you are probably right: we need to escape the flight/fight mechanism if we are going to mediate by solving a problem jointly. However, I think that there is more to it.

Consider Ben's approach to this game -an approach much admired by game theorists and economists. He quite correctly notes that my solution is not a best response to a best response -after all, the bidder could accept the offer not to bid, take the money and renege.

Ben sees the point of the game in different manner than I do. He can force his point of view upon me; he and I will then battle together and give money away to the auctioneer. It is as much about what we choose to see the point of the game as it is about rationality.

]]> http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/conflict-resolution/michael-websters-resolution-to-the-shubik-dollar-auction-game/#22137 http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/conflict-resolution/michael-websters-resolution-to-the-shubik-dollar-auction-game/#22137 CollaborationConflict ResolutionDeal MakingMediationMoneyNegotiationNegotiation Strategy and TacticsSettlementSocial Psychology Wed, 24 Oct 2007 23:33:22 -0800 Victoria Pynchon Sam Bid $19 at the start and the bidding will stop, netting $1.

]]> http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/conflict-resolution/michael-websters-resolution-to-the-shubik-dollar-auction-game/#22138 http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/conflict-resolution/michael-websters-resolution-to-the-shubik-dollar-auction-game/#22138 CollaborationConflict ResolutionDeal MakingMediationMoneyNegotiationNegotiation Strategy and TacticsSettlementSocial Psychology Wed, 24 Oct 2007 23:33:22 -0800 Victoria Pynchon Michael Webster Sam,two points.

1. The rules of game require each person to bid at least once.

2. Why would you settle for $1 if you could get close to $10?

]]> http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/conflict-resolution/michael-websters-resolution-to-the-shubik-dollar-auction-game/#22139 http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/conflict-resolution/michael-websters-resolution-to-the-shubik-dollar-auction-game/#22139 CollaborationConflict ResolutionDeal MakingMediationMoneyNegotiationNegotiation Strategy and TacticsSettlementSocial Psychology Wed, 24 Oct 2007 23:33:22 -0800 Victoria Pynchon