I think my skepticism would depend on which terrorist you claimed you thought could be reasoned with.

One of the reasons why “normal” negotiations methods are successful with parties in a conflict between nation-states, NGO's, etc., is that a rational self-interest can be indetified (as noted in the article above). Appeals to can be made to the parties self-interest and to "reason." They can be presented alternatives they might find tempting; they can be manipulated and simply, they can be bargained with. They WANT something.

Iran can be bargained with. They have a national identity and easily identifiable self-interests. The Mujahadeen who became the Northern Alliance and those who became the Taliban could be bargained with. The IRA? ETA? Red Army Faction? FARC? Shining Path? VC? Sandinistas? For the most part, they all had a national/racial/ethnic identity and identifiable self interests.

Al Qaeda does not. They do not fall within any previously known category. They are fully willing to place the interests of the “jihad” over their personal self-interest. They do not understand or believe in the concept of individualism or individual rights or even self-preservation. They have no national identity and believe their identity derives from being Muslim. They believe that their reward is in their vision of heaven/paradise. They believe that death is a greater reward than anything that can be offered by an earthly being, especially an infidel interrogator. They believe in an absolute vision where their viewpoint, their belief, is the “one true way” and they have the supposed “word of god” to support this. There are no “innocents” to them. If a bomb kills an infidel, then so be it. If it kills another Muslim or themself, then that Muslim is in “paradise” and should be pleased to be in the presence of “god.” They do not want simply to be left alone. They want to establish a Caliphate and rule the "holy land." They are not rational in any Western concept of the word.

There have been extremist groups willing to kill for their cause, and some groups willing to die in combat for it. History is also replete with famous “last stands.” Even a cornered mouse will turn and attack a human when it determines there is no other option. But the willingness to strap on a homicide bomb and walk into a crowd of innocents illustrates a fundamental difference in philosophy.

These people are willing to sacrifice themselves in order to slaughter those who do not believe, those with whom they do not agree, those who will not convert. Therefore, most of these pan-Islamic extremists are irrational and cannot be bargained with or reasoned with.

I am not hawkish. I don't want to bomb them to the stone age, nor am I out of vengeance for 9/11. But I also do not believe that every conflict can be resolved with negotiation. Some parties simply need the resolution provided by a judge or jury and some international conflicts can only be solved by force. Ideally, I wish this were not the case. But it is.

UPDATE: SEE THE NYTIMES ARTICLE ON AL QAEDA IN IRAQ TODAY FOR A MORE READABLE AND THOROUGH ANALYSIS OF THE THREAT PLAYED BY THIS MILITANT GROUP WHOSE "AREA OF OPERATIONS" GENERAL PETRAEUS SAYS "HAS BEEN GREATLY REDUCED IN TERMS OF CONTROLLING AREAS THAT IT CONTROLLED AS LITTLE AS A YEAR AND A HALF AGO.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/19/us/politics/19threat.html?_r=1&hp=&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1208621232-RgqwdcW0Ut9bFwG/V3P6jw

THIS LINK IS A GOOD "TEACH-IN" ON THE GROUPS IN PLAY IN IRAQ TODAY, WITH ONE EXPERT SAYING "THIS IS MUCH MORE FRACTIONATED THAN MOST PEOPLE COULD IMAGINE, WITH MULTIPLE, INDEPENDENT MOVING PARTS, AND WHEN YOU HAVE THAT UNIVERSE OF NETWORKS, YOU CAN'T HAVE A ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL APPROACH."

YESTERDAY'S RESPONSE TO CHRIS:

What I would question here is whether radical Islamist movements are quite so united ideologically as you suggest. One suspects that there is a spectrum of members outside the inner circles of these movements ranging from the pure religious zealot to the true political revolutionary.

The present U.S. military strategy (of which I am not a fan) rests upon the principle that "the people" are rational actors who can be won or lost in a "war of ideas." That being the case, it would serve us well to make an effort to actually learn about the full spectrum of people within these movements, i.e., what motivates them REALLY, to have any hope whatsoever that non-fascist governments might develop in Muslim countries.

The Al Qaeda memos that started this exchange show its leadership to be at odds with itself and with its members. That heartened me because one despairs when one thinks the enemy is of a single mind and incapable of movement toward a center.

I pulled the following analysis of our present military strategy from an article written by a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps -- Michael F. Morris -- USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT AL-QAEDA AS INSURGENCY. Full article here: http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/LessonsLearned/middleeast/Al-Qaeda%20as%20Insurgency%20.pdf

First, just to understand who we're talking about when we talk about al-Qaeda, Morris reports that it is "relatively small ([less than] 100 hard core adherents) but [that] in
Afghanistan it did train approximately 18,000 fighters, who have subsequently dispersed around the world in some 60 countries. Of this small army . . . perhaps 3,000 are true al-Qaeda troops, as opposed to mere beneficiaries of al-Qaeda tactical training."

3,000 al Qaeda members. That's small enough to get our arms around.

There remains a "heart's and minds" battle to be won here -- one that encourages moderates to step forward and resist the radical fringe. As Morris states, "the militant Islamic threat which al-Qaeda represents is not monolithic in nature." He explains:

Branches of al-Qaeda and organizations similar to bin Laden’s may be different in important ways.

In the early days of the Cold War, the West thought the communist threat was monolithic; time and experience proved that it was not. Neither is the Salafist threat. All politics are local – even the politics of religion.

[Integrated counterinsurgency] (COIN) strategists must therefore evaluate each case on its own merits.

While Islamic militants may cooperate with each other in a global fashion, the program they craft to topple a particular government requires independent analysis and a counterrevolutionary strategy that recognizes and leverages local conditions. . . . .

Al-Qaeda is the most deadly of the more than 100 Islamic militant groups formed over the past 25 years. The danger it poses flows from its willingness to employ weapons of mass effect, its global reach, its focus on targeting America, and most importantly its revolutionary and expansionist ideology.

Armed action is [al Qaeda's] primary strategy,but there are intriguing aspects of mass mobilization techniques that serve to strengthen its organizational impact and resiliency.

Elements unique to its methodology include transnational networking and a multi-ethnic constituency. Together these factors comprise an evolving
style of spiritually based insurgency . . . The disparate nature of the threat – in essence a global, but somewhat leisurely paced guerrilla war - makes it difficult to focus an effective strategic response. But al-Qaeda’s organizational and strategic choices also make it tough for the movement to concentrate its power in ways that achieve its political ends. Thus far no targeted Islamic government has fallen to al-Qaeda inspired violence.

Nor have bin Laden’s attacks compelled or coerced America to alter its policies in the Middle East. The resulting contest of wills is classically asymmetric.

Long term success for the United States will require support for true political
reform, a revolutionary cause in itself, among autocratic Islamic governments. This path, though potentially destabilizing in the short term, holds more promise in the long run as radical Islamic insurgents are forced to compete with more moderate political rivals in the market place
of ideas.

A clear policy – one that identifies Salafist ideology as the problem and enunciates America’s opposition to the politics of jihad - is essential.

Victory also demands delegitimizing
the radical Wahhabian strain of Islam that considers the killing of civilians not just a useful tactic but also a religious imperative. This goal, though beyond the means of a non-Muslim country to effect independently, is the crux of the issue . . . "